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Vicinage, Venue, and Community Cross-
Section: Obstacles to a State
Defendant's Right to a Trial by a
Representative Jury
By LISA E. ALEXANDER*
Introduction
"The jury's legitimacy has always rested in its capacity to express
fairly the community's conscience .... I One of the criminal jury's
critical functions is to act as a buffer between government and defend-
ant.2 "The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power - to make available the commonsense [sic] judgment of the com-
munity as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in
preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased re-
sponse of a judge."3
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a jury
derived from a jury pool composed of a cross-section of the community
in which the crime occurred.' Exclusion of distinctive, also known as
cognizable, groups within the community can occur at different stages of
jury selection. Tor example, jury selection statutes can exclude cogniza-
ble groups, such as African-Americans, when a list of all possible jurors
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., Northwestern University, 1986; C.Phil. University
of California, Berkeley, 1988. The author thanks Louis Biggio and Professor David Levine for
their valuble suggestions and criticism.
1. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMIT-
MENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 9 (1977).
2. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
100 (1970).
3. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56).
4. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law ...." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
Under modem federal criminal procedure, the trial is held in the district in which the
crime was committed. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. A change of venue is permitted only when there
is a danger of an unfair trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21.
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is compiled to form a "jury pool."' Jury selection systems can also ex-
clude cognizable groups when prospective jurors, known as the "venire,"
are summoned to a courthouse to be considered to serve on a jury.6 In
addition, discrimination can occur during voir dire, the selection of a
particular jury for a trial.7 Discrimination at this stage typically consists
of racially motivated peremptory challenges.8
The United States Supreme Court, relying on both the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial9 and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection Clause,10 has protected a defendant's right to a jury representing
a cross-section of the community from discriminatory practices. 1' The
Court has yet to consider the effect vicinage has on representation of
cognizable groups in the jury pool and venire.' 2
The site of a trial can profoundly affect the demographic composi-
tion of the jury pool. Venue, the place where the trial is held,' 3 generally
determines vicinage, the geographic origin of the jury.14 Both venue and
vicinage influence the demographic composition of the jury pool and, in
turn, the jury ultimately selected from it.
5. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,
363-64 (1979) (statutory scheme that diminished representation of women in the jury pool held
unconstitutional).
6. See e.g., Hernandez v. Municipal Court, 781 P.2d 547 (Cal. 1989), cert denied, 110 S.
Ct. 3222 (1990); Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 285
(1989).
7. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (racially discriminatory exercise of per-
emptory challenges held unconstitutional).
8. Id.
9. See generally, Robert Wilson Rodriguez, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Equal Protec-
tion, The Fair Cross-Section Requirement, and the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 37 EMORY L.J. 755 (1988).
10. "No State shall... deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 9.
11. E.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (racially discriminatory exercise of per-
emptory challenges held unconstitutional); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (exclusion
of women from jury service held unconstitutional).
12. Prior to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial applies to the states), and long before equal protection or cross-
section of the community were considered, the Court interpreted the "vicinage" requirement
loosely. E.g., Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918) (a district court may draw
jurors from a single division within the district when it is unclear where the crime was commit-
ted); Lewis v. United States, 279 U.S. 63 (1929) (held constitutional the conduct of a trial in
the eastern district of Oklahoma, which failed to include the site of the crime).
The Court's discussion of the historical roots of the Sixth Amendment vicinage provision
in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 96 (1970) suggests that a fair cross-section analysis may be
implicit in interpreting the vicinage requirement.
13. Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 801, 805 (1976).
14. Id. Venue, however, can be severed from vicinage. For example, the site of the trial,
venue, could be moved, while the jury originates in a different geographical area. See id. at
804-05.
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In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court decision, different juris-
dictions have reached varying conclusions about the interaction between
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and the Sixth Amendment
vicinage requirements. These range from defining the vicinage to fairly
represent the community to treating the vicinage provision as a substan-
tively empty procedural rule.15
This Note considers (1) the early development of the Sixth Amend-
ment vicinage requirement; (2) the development of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection of cognizable groups injury pools and the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from the cross-section of the
community; (3) the different approaches taken by varying jurisdictions;
(4) an evaluation of the various approaches; and (5) a proposed approach
to vicinage and venue that accommodates Sixth Amendment and Four-
teenth Amendment concerns.
I. The Early Development of the Sixth Amendment Right to a
Trial by Jury
A. Development of the Anglo-American Jury
The jury evolved into a democratic institution over a number of cen-
turies.16 The Anglo-American jury began as an instrument of the King
of England that investigated civil complaints. 7 Originally, medieval ju-
rors had personal knowledge of the crime. 8 The jury members acted as
witnesses and also conducted investigations. 9 Accordingly, to be of any
value, the jury needed to reside in the vicinity of the location of the
crime.20 As residents of the community, the jury would be familiar with
the parties and the dispute.
The jury's role changed by the time of the American Revolution.2'
15. Williams v. Superior Court, 781 P.2d 537 (Cal. 1989); Hernandez v. Municipal Court,
781 P.2d 547 (Cal. 1989), cert denied, 110 S.Ct. 3222 (1990).
16. See generally John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The
Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 203-04 (1988); Van
Dyke, supra note 1, at 2-9.
17. Mitnick, supra note 16, at 203-04. The development of the criminal jury paralleled
that of the civil. Id. at 232.
For a detailed discussion of medieval and colonial vicinage, see FRANCIS HELLER, THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTIUTON OF THE UNITED STATES, 6-12, (1951); Kershen,
supra, note 13, at 805-18 (1976).
18. Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 2. In the twelfth century, jurors were often noble juror-
witnesses. Id.
19. Mitnick, supra note 16, at 203-04; Heller, supra note 17, at 8.
20. See Mitnick, supra note 16, at 203-04 (discussing juror's personal knowledge of dis-
pute); Kershen, supra note 13, at 813-14; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970) and
accompanying notes (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 350-51 (1768)).
21. Kershen, supra note 13, at 816. See Mitnick, supra note 16, at 220-26 (tracing the
change in the jurors possessing personal knowledge). By the fourteenth century, jurors and
witnesses had become separate classes. Mitnick, supra note 16, at 204. In the seventeenth
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First, jurors had become relatively independent of the crown.2 2 Second,
rather than relying on personal knowledge and investigation, the jury
decided factual issues by passively listening to formal evidence at trial. 3
Nonetheless, the vicinity of the crime remained the source of the jurors.24
The American colonists held the jury in high esteem. 25  One reason
for the importance of the jury was a more widespread use of public prose-
cutors in the colonies than in England.26 The government's expanded
role in criminal prosecution emphasized the role of the jury as a buffer
between the accused and the government.27 Because the colonists held
the jury in high esteem, one of their major grievances was against the
English statutes which provided that colonists accused of certain capital
crimes were to be tried in England.28 Consequently, the regulation of
jury trials was important to the Framers of the Constitution.
B. Venue and Vicinage in the Constitution
The United States Constitution expressly mandates the provision of
local juries: in Article III and the Sixth Amendment.29 While the venue
provision in Article III requires all criminal trials to be within the state
in which the crime was committed,3" the Sixth Amendment requires
criminal trial "by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed."31 Although the Sixth Amendment
century, jurors had become dependent on evidence formally presented in trial and could no
longer possess personal knowledge. Id at 204-05 (citing E. COKE, THE THEW PART OF THE
INSTrTUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 163 (1644)), 220-21 (citing 3 W. BLAcKsToNE, COM-
MENTARIEs 359-60 (1768)).
22. Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 4-5 (citing Bushnell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670))
(upholding a jury verdict that contradicted a magistrate's direction)).
23. Kershen, supra note 13, at 813; Mitnick, supra note 16, at 220-21.
24. Kershen, supra note 13, at 813; Heller, supra note 17, at 19-20 (discussing colonial
statutes calling jurors from the vicinity of the crime).
25. Mitnick, supra note 16, at 230; Kershen, supra note 13, at 814-15.
26. Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 6; Heller, supra note 17, at 21-22.
27. Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 6; Heller supra note 17, at 21-22.
28. See Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 6-7; Kershen, supra note 13, at 805-08 (describing the
irate colonial reaction to British attempts to curtail the right to jury trial); Heller, supra note
17, at 21 (citing the Declaration of Rights of the Continental Congress, art. 5 (1774)). Note
the following statement from the Declaration of Independence: "He has combined with others
to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution... depriving us in many cases of the
benefits of Trial by Jury: For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences.
.." Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). See also, Kershen, supra note 13, at 808-11
(discussing colonial attempts to protect the right to a jury trial in venue and vicinage laws
during and immediately following the American Revolution).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, see. 2, cl. 3., and U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30. "The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed. .. ." U.S.
CoNST. art. III, see. 2, cl. 3.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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does not use the word "vicinage," this note will refer to this clause as the
Sixth Amendment vicinage provision.
The Article III venue provision was meant to protect a defendant
from the kind of governmental abuses seen during colonial times, such as
holding trials of American colonists in England.32 Keeping the trial
within the state would decrease the probability of a defendant facing trial
far from family and friends.3 In addition, a local trial would help the
defendant provide witnesses and evidence for his or her defense.34 Fi-
nally, the venue provision also implicitly recognized the state's sover-
eignty and jurisdiction, and the crime's relation to the community.35
The venue provision did not satisfy all of the Framers 6 who debated
vicinage proposals during the Constitution ratification conventions.37
Debates over vicinage continued through the first Congress in 1789.38 It
was during this time that James Madison and a congressional committee
began work on a constitutional vicinage amendment.3 9
Intense debate surrounded the drafting of this clause," reflecting the
Framers' concern with the right to a trial by a jury of one's peers in the
community.41 An early Madison proposal provided that "[tihe trial of
all crimes... shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage
.... "42 Other Framers feared that a jury drawn from a single small
locality in a rebellious district would protect a local leader of a rebel-
lion.43 Evidence suggests that the strict vicinage requirement was re-
moved because the Framers believed the venue requirement adequately
preserved the vicinage feature. 4 Other debate centered on the meaning
32. Kershen, supra note 13, at 808-09.
33. Id. at 808-10. See also United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958) ("The provi-
sion for trial in the vicinity of the crime is a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship
involved when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place.").
34. Kershen, supra note 13, at 810.
35. Id at 811-12.
36. See Id at 816-17 (describing the Constitutional Convention discussion of a vicinage
clause).
37. E.g., HI ELLIOT'S DEBATES 658 (Virginia); H ELLIOT'S DEBATES 109-14 (Massachu-
setts). See also Kershen, supra note 13, at 816-17.
38. Kershen, supra note 13, at 817-18 (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789)); Heller,
supra note 17, at 28-34.
39. Kershen, supra note 13, at 818-21 (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789) and V THE
WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1787-1790, at 418 (Hunt 1904)).
40. Kershen, supra note 13, at 817-28.
41. Early American colonial vicinage practice varied. Kershen, supra note 13, at 813-14;
Heller, supra note 17, at 16-25 (discussing different colonial approaches to vicinage). By the
time of the Constitutional Convention, at least two state constitutions had a vicinage require-
ment. Kershen, supra note 13, at 814-16.
42. I ANNALS OF CONG. 788-89 (1789). See also Kershen, supra note 13, at 818-24; Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970) and accompanying notes.
43. Kershen, supra note 13, at 822-24.
44. Id. at 824-25.
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of the term; it was unclear if vicinage would be defined by district, com-
munity, neighborhood or state.45
The Framers finally agreed that jurors should be drawn from the
"district and state" in which the crime was committed.46 They left to
Congress the job of defining those terms.47 While Congress determined
the exact size of the district, the vicinage clause "preserved the connec-
tion between the place of the commission of the crime and the place of
residence of the jurors."4 Evidence suggests that the Sixth Amendment
"district" requirement was strengthened by the vicinage provision in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.19
When the sixth amendment and the Judiciary Act of 1789 are read
together, it appears clear that the right to trial by a jury of the
vicinage had emerged from the First Session of the First Congress
as a rather robust right. Even though the sixth amendment had no
immediate practical impact with respect to limiting the geographi-
cal area from which jurors could be selected, the concept of vici-
nage had achieved constitutional status through reference to
"districts." Whether the sixth amendment would have practical
impact would then depend upon how future legislatures exercised
the power to create judicial districts. Whenever a judicial district
was created smaller in area than the area of the state, the sixth
amendment would have a practical impact.50
The final wording of the Sixth Amendment represented a compro-
mise between advocates of strict juror-residence vicinage and those who
wanted less restraint on the power of the national government. 5
II. Development of the Right to a Representative Jury Under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury applies to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.52 The
Supreme Court has held that the defendant also has a right to a "repre-
45. Id. at 822-23 (citing V THE WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1787-1790, at 424 (Hunt
1904)).
46. Iad at 826-27.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 843.
49. See id at 860. The Judiciary Act of 1789 states: "the trial shall be had in the county
where the offence was committed,... twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from
thence." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat 88, ch. 20, 29 (1789).
The Act gave each district court the discretionary power to select jurors from such parts
of the district as necessary to secure a fair and impartial jury and not inconvenience jurors.
See also Kershen, supra note 13, at 825-28.
50. Kershen, supra note 13, at 860.
51. Id at 826-28.
52. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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sentative jury."53 The Court has defined "representative jury" as a jury
selected from a jury pool that represents a cross-section of the commu-
nity. 4 Although every jury need not mirror the exact demographic com-
position of the community, the jury selection system must provide a fair
possibility of obtaining a representative jury pool. 5 Consequently, mem-
bers of cognizable groups within the community may not be excluded. 6
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to a Representative Jury Pool and the
Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection
The first attempts to obtain representative jury pools relied on the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.57  In 1880, the
Supreme Court held that a jury selection scheme that excluded members
of the defendant's race violated the defendant's right to equal protec-
tion." The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause has subse-
quently been held to prevent purposeful discrimination in jury
selection.59 To make a successful challenge under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a defendant must show that the state intentionally caused
disproportional representation of a cognizable group in the jury or jury
pool.60
A Sixth Amendment violation focuses on a criminal defendant's
fundamental interest in a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the com-
munity.61 Rather than demonstrating the state's discriminatory intent, a
defendant making a Sixth Amendment challenge must show that the jury
selection scheme systematically deprived her of a jury pool that repre-
53. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975).
54. Eg., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 538 (1975) (statutory scheme that diminished the representation of women in the jury
pool held unconstitutional). The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether the
vicinage provision is applicable to the states.
55. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
56. Id
57. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See generally, Rodriguez, supra note
9, at 768.
58. 100 U.S. at 306-07. Strauder was one of the earliest Supreme Court cases discussing
an individual's right to a representative jury. In Strauder, the Court found a West Virginia
statute that permitted only white males to serve on the jury unconstitutional. Id. at 306-07.
The court reasoned that because African-Americans were excluded from the jury pool, the
defendant, who was African-American, was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection. Id at 306. See also Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 759-63 (discussing other related
Supreme Court cases using this type of analysis).
59. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1986).
60. Id at 96-98. See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (A white defendant success-
fully challenged the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury pool); Rodri-
guez, supra note 9, at 764-67.
61. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-70 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
533-34 (1975). See also, Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 770-71.
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sents a cross-section of the community.
62
Many of the Court's rulings on a defendant's right to a representa-
tive jury rely on both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.6 None-
theless, a defendant has no "right to a grand or petit jury composed in
whole or in part of persons of his own race or color ... ."6 The Court
has limited the Sixth Amendment to challenges arising at the jury pool
and venire composition, while the Equal Protection challenges have fo-
cused on voir dire.6"
B. Development of the Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Representing
a Cross-Section of the Community
The Court first considered the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section
of the community requirement during the 1940s.66 In Smith v. Texas,67 a
case challenging the exclusion of African-Americans from the jury pool,
the Court ruled that the jury pool must be representative of the commu-
nity.68 Although relying on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the Court articulated community cross-section
considerations, declaring "[i]t is part of the established tradition in the
use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly
representative of the community."69 This idea of a jury composed of a
community cross-section dominated the opinion in Glasser v. United
States:7  "our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a 'body truly
representative of the community,' and not the organ of any special group
or class."71
The Court discussed the policies underlying the community cross-
section approach in a civil case, Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. 2 In Thiel,
the Court held that the exclusion of wage earners from the jury was at
odds with the Seventh Amendment7 right to a jury trial composed of
62. Duren, 439 U.S. at 370-71.
63. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 763-64.
64. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880).
65. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 806-08 (1990) (holding that a white defendant
cannot rely on the Sixth Amendment to challenge the prosecution's use of racially motivated
peremptory challenges).
66. See Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 767-69 (analyzing early Sixth Amendment community
cross-section cases).
67. 311 U.S. 128 (1940). See also, Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 767-68.
68. 311 U.S. at 130-31.
69. Id. at 130.
70. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
71. Id. at 85-86. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 767-72 (tracing the develop-
ment of community-cross section analysis).
72. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. VII states: "In Suits at common law.., the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved." Nothing in the Thiel opinion indicates that the Court approach was
unique to civil juries. The case has been cited by subsequent criminal cases such as Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975).
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members from the cross-section of the community. "Were we to sanc-
tion an exclusion of this nature... [w]e would breathe life into any latent
tendencies to establish the jury as the instrument of the economically and
socially privileged."'74
A few years later, race and jury representation again surfaced in
Hernandez v. Texas." The Hernandez court held that the systematic ex-
clusion of Mexican-Americans from the jury pool violated the defend-
ant's right to equal protection. 76 The Court discussed the harm posed by
excluding a segment of the community, and the effect of such exclusion
on the jury's ability to deliver a fair verdict.77
The Court addressed both Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment con-
cerns in Peters v. Kiff."s In Peters, the Court held that a white defendant
had standing to challenge a racially discriminatory jury pool selection
system on both Equal Protection and cross-section of the community
grounds.79 According to the Court, the defendant could make an Equal
Protection challenge on behalf of the excluded class of potential jurors,
who had a right to participate in the justice system. 0 In addition, the
Court stated that the defendant had the right to make a Sixth Amend-
ment challenge to the jury pool:"1 "[A] State cannot, consistent with due
process, subject a defendant to indictment or trial by a jury that has been
selected in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner .... Unconstitu-
tional jury selection procedures cast doubt on the integrity of the whole
judicial process." 2 The .Court feared that excluding a particular group
from the jury pool could affect the range of viewpoints represented in the
deliberation room and thus deny the defendant a trial by a fair and im-
partial jury.8 3
In a subsequent Sixth Amendment opinion, Taylor v. Louisiana,8 4
the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana jury selection scheme that
excluded women. 5 Justice White, writing for the majority, emphatically
stated that "[This] Court has unambiguously declared that the American
74. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 223-24.
75. 347 U.S 475, 478 (1954).
76. Md at 477-78.
77. let
78. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
79. Id at 498-503.
80. Id at 499.
81. Id- at 500-01 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states). But see Holland v. Illinois, 110
S.Ct. 803 (1990) (holding that a white defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to
challenge racially motivated peremptory challenges exercised during jury selection and limit-
ing Peters Sixth Amendment challenges to jury pools and venires).
82. Peters, 407 U.S. at 502-03.
83. Id at 503-04.
84. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
85. Id. at 525.
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concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community." 6 The Taylor opinion established that the
right to a jury drawn from the cross-section of the community was a
fundamental one. 7 The Court held that a jury pool selection system that
disproportionately diminished the number of women from jury service
was unconstitutional."8 Although a state could make reasonable exemp-
tions from jury service, it could do so only to the extent that the jury pool
reasonably represented the community.89 In addition, exclusion of wo-
men from jury service, even for administrative efficiency was insufficient
to overcome the defendant's interest in a jury representing a cross section
of the community.90
The Supreme Court expanded this analysis and formulated a test for
a Sixth Amendment cross-section violation in Duren v. Missouri.91
Under the Duren test, a defendant must demonstrate that: 1) the people
excluded are members of a distinct, also known as cognizable, group
within the community; 2) the representation of this group in the venire
was not fair and reasonable in relation to its population in the commu-
nity; and 3) the underrepresentation of the group was due to a process
that systematically excluded the group.92 Once a defendant makes this
showing, the burden then shifts to the state to explain the jury pool com-
position.93 The state must then demonstrate that disproportionate repre-
sentation was designed for the primary purpose of advancing a significant
state interest.94
The Supreme Court returned to Fourteenth Amendment considera-
tions in Batson v. Kentucky. 95 The Batson Court set forth a test for the
unconstitutional use of the prosecution's peremptory challenges during
jury selection.96 To make a prima facie case, the defendant must show:
1) the excluded potential juror(s) was a member of the defendant's race;
2) the prosecution removed members of the defendant's race; and 3) rele-
vant circumstances existed to raise an inference of discrimination.97
Although the Batson Court expressly limited its holding to chal-
86. Ia at 527.
87. Id. at 525.
88. Id at 527. For a detailed analysis of the Taylor decision, see Elizabeth Bileete, Note,
Taylor v. Louisiana: The Jury Cross.Section Crosses the State Line, 7 CoNN. L. R-v. 508
(1975).
89. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
90. Id at 538.
91. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
92. Id at 364.
93. Id at 368.
94. Id at 366-68.
95. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
96. Id at 86.
97. Id at 96. Suspicious circumstances would include a pattern of peremptory challenges
against members of a particular race. Id at 97.
lenges brought under the Fourteenth Amendment,9" the Sixth Amend-
ment cross-section of the community requirement is implicit in the
opinion. 99 The Batson opinion noted that excluding members of racial
groups during the jury selection process violates the Equal Protection
clause "because it denies [the defendant] the very protection that a trial
by jury is intended to secure, ' ' 10° a check on official power. The Court
further acknowledged the role of the community in the justice system as
lending legitimacy to the justice process. "I
In Powers v. Ohio,"0 2 the Court held that a white defendant may
raise a Fourteenth Amendment Batson challenge on behalf of potential
African-American jurors. Although the decision turned on third party
standing, the Court emphasized the right of African-Americans not to be
excluded from jury service. 3 The opinion also emphasized that a crimi-
nal justice system that permitted racial discrimination in its jury selection
could not maintain its integrity."° Thus, the Court has used both the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to protect defendants from discrimi-
nation during jury selection.
C. Application of the Vicinage Clause to the States
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide if the Sixth
Amendment vicinage provision applies to the states under the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The Court, however, was faced
with the issue in a petition for certiorari. In Mallett v. State,10 5 an Afri-
can-American defendant was accused of killing a white police officer in a
98. IM at 84 n.4. See also Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batsori v. Kentucky: A Half Step in
the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Con-
fines of Equal Protection), 72 CORNELL L. Rnv. 1026 (1987).
Other decisions have extended Batson. Eg., People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990) (extending Batson to defendant's use of peremptories);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991) (extending Batson to civil actions).
For a discussion of extending Batson to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges, see J.
Alexander Tanford, Racism in the Adversary Systen: The Defendant's Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 63 So. CAL. L. REv. 1015 (1990). For a critique of lower court implementation of
Batson see Theodore McMillian and Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A Promise
Unfulfilled, U.M.K.C. L. REv. 361 (1990).
99. But cf Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1868-72 (1991) (no Batson violation
for exclusion of Spanish-speaking veniremen and no discussion of the effect on community
representation); Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990). In Holland, the Court held that
Batson did not directly apply to a white defendant challenging exclusion of African-American
jurors. Id at 806. Yet even the Holland majority conceded that the Sixth Amendment re-
quired a possibility of representative jury, at least at the jury pool level. Id
100. 476 U.S. at 86 & n.8.
101. Id at 87.
102. 111 S. CL 1364 (1991).
103. Id at 1368-69.
104. Id at 1371.
105. 769 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1308 (1990).
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district with a significant African-American population." 6 The defend-
ant moved for a change of venue because of publicity regarding the case,
which the court granted."0 7 He also requested a district with a compara-
ble African-American population. 10 Despite this request, the defendant
was tried and convicted in a virtually all white district." 9 On appeal, the
Missouri Supreme Court applied the Batson "10 test to the jury pool and
found no discriminatory intent behind the change in venue"' nor preju-
dice in the jury pool composition.' 12 The Missouri court affirmed the
conviction, and held that the change of venue was not prejudicial." 3
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.1'4 Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Brennan, dissented.' 15 Marshall
concluded that the defendant had met the Batson test." 6 Marshall noted
that alternative venues existed with comparable African-American popu-
lation as the district in which the crime was committed." 7 Therefore,
Justice Marshall reasoned, the absence of African-Americans in the new
venue's jury pool supported a prima facie case of discrimination and a
Fourteenth Amendment violation." 8
Marshall also contended that Missouri had deprived the defendant
to the right to a trial by a jury representing a cross-section of the commu-
nity under the Taylor v. Louisiana interpretation of the Sixth Amend-
ment. 19 He also maintained that the change in the vicinage and jury
pool violated both the Fourteenth.Amendment Equal Protection Clause
and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by the cross-section of the
community. 120
The federal courts are currently divided on this issue. The Sec-
ond, 12 Seventh, 22 and Ninth 23 circuits have implicitly accepted the ap-
plication of the vicinage provision as part of the Sixth Amendment right
106. 769 S.W.2d at 78-79.
107. Id. at 81.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 79.
110. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
111. Id. at 80-81.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 79-81.
114. Mallett v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1308 (1990) (Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Black-
mun dissenting).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1309.
117. I& at 1310.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id
121. Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 1976).
122. Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1989).
123. Bradley v. Superior Court, 531 F.2d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 1976).
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to jury trial. The Third,12 4 Fifth, 12 5 and Sixth 1 2 6 Circuits have ruled that
the vicinage provision does not apply. The remaining circuits have not
conclusively considered the issue since Duncan.
The federal courts that have rejected the application of the Sixth
Amendment vicinage requirement to the states have done so for two rea-
sons. First, these circuits argue that the Sixth Amendment vicinage pro-
vision is not required for a fundamentally fair trial, and is therefore not
binding on the states under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.12 7 Second, they maintain that the Framers drafted the Sixth
Amendment vicinage provision to complement the judicial districts of
the federal court system created by the Judiciary Act of 1789.12' Because
the states have independent courts and jury pool selection systems, the
Sixth Amendment vicinage provision is irrelevant and inapplicable to the
states. 129
i. Vicinage in the State Courts
The right to a jury representing a cross-section of the community is
central to the right to a fair trial. The issue is how to define the "commu-
nity" to be represented. It is this prong of the Duren test,130 the relation-
ship of the representation of a class within the jury pool to that of the
population at large, that hinges on the geographic limits of the commu-
nity. Venue and vicinage define the community against which courts will
assess the minority representation in the jury pool for constitutional
purposes.
State courts have grappled with the effect of venue and vicinage on
minority representation in jury pools. Not all states have accepted the
Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement. 13 1 This section of the Note
considers how the states of Alaska, Florida, New York, Illinois, and Cal-
ifornia have interpreted the Sixth Amendment vicinage provision in the
context of their jury selection systems.
124. Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981)
(upholding a New Jersey change of venue despite changes in the jury pool).
125. Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding a Texas change of venue).
126. Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1988) (upholding a change of venue in a
criminal trial in Kentucky).
127. Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 1986).
128. Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1988). See supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
129. 857 F.2d at 346.
130. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
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A. Alaska: Relating Vicinage to the Community Cross-Section
Requirement
At one end of the spectrum stands Alaska. In Alvarado v. State, 3 2
the Alaska Supreme Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights had been violated. 133 The defendant, a Native Alaskan, was con-
victed of a crime that occurred in his village, four-hundred-fifty miles
away from Anchorage, which was the site of the trial.13 4 Nearly all of
the defendant's village population was also Native Alaskan. 35 Pursuant
to Alaska's jury selection scheme, the vicinage encompassed a fifteen
mile radius surrounding Anchorage. 36
The Alaska Supreme Court declared that the vicinage violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury from a cross-section of the
community.' 37  "[T]he traditional starting point for determining the
community from which jurors are to be selected is the scene of the al-
leged offense."' 38 The Alvarado court looked to the United States
Supreme Court Sixth Amendment cases139 and to the values underlying
the Sixth Amendment."4 The court acknowledged the role of the jury as
a safeguard against an arbitrary government.' 4 ' It is also recognized that
the jury allows citizens to participate in the government and to increase
the public's confidence in the fairness of the judicial system. 42 If sec-
tions of the community were systematically excluded, the jury could not
fill this role. 143
The court conceded that the concept of "community" was flexible,
and gave a significant deference to the legislature in defining the vici-
nage.144 The court, however, required the vicinage to encompass at least
132. 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971).
133. Id at 904.
134. Id at 893-94.
135. Id
136. Id (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.050 (1969))
137. Id at 902.
138. Id Race was only one factor considered by the court; it also considered the juror's
sensitivity to the community's values. Id at 901. The court was also sensitive to "the enor-
mous gulf which separates the modes of life of the typical Alaskan villager from the type of
existence led by most residents of Anchorage.... ." Id at 899. The court still granted wide
deference to the legislature on defining community, as long as the vicinage encompassed the
area of the alleged offense. Id at 902.
Indiana recently adopted the Alvarado court's approach. Mareska v. State, 534 N.E.2d
246 (Ind. 1989) (change of venue to a different city within a county, with a concurrent change
in jury pool, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from the place
where the crime was committed).
139. See supra notes 52-104 and accompanying text.
140. Alvarado, 486 P.2d at 901.
141. Id at 903.
142. Id
143. Id. at 904.
144. Id. at 905.
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the area of the alleged crime.145
B. Florida: The State Constitution's Strict Vicinage Requirement
The Florida Supreme Court, relying on the state constitution, re-
cently reached the same conclusion as the Alaska Supreme Court,
although on less striking facts.'" The Florida Constitution states: "In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall.., have the right... to have
a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where the crime
was committed."' 4 7 In Spencer v. State,'4 8 the court ruled the unequal
minority representation in the two judicial districts of Palm Beach
County violated Florida's constitution.' 49
To reduce travel inconvenience for jurors, Palm Beach County was
divided into two jury districts: one in West Palm Beach and one in Belle
Glade.' Each district was served by a branch courthouse.' 51 All the
jurors in a criminal case were drawn from one district exclusively. 152 An
administrative order provided that every criminal case was automatically
set for trial in the West Palm Beach district, even if the crime occurred in
the Belle Glade district.5 3 A defendant, however, was permitted to re-
quest a transfer to the Belle Glade district if the offense was committed in
that district.
154
The defendant, Spencer, was charged with first degree murder com-
mitted in the West Palm Beach District, and his trial was set for the West
Palm Beach courthouse. African-Americans comprised 7.5 % of the reg-
istered voters in Palm Beach County, but comprised over 50% of the
registered voters in the Belle Glade district and 6.4% of the registered
voters in the West Palm Beach district. 55 The defendant moved to have
his trial in the Belle Glade district. The prosecution argued that 6.4% of
the West Palm Beach district population was African-American, and this
figure reasonably represented the 7.5% county wide African-American
population.' 56 The Florida Supreme Court, relying on a state equal pro-
tection analysis, found this disparity to be "an unconstitutional system-
atic exclusion of a significant portion of the black population" from the
defendant's jury pool.5 7 The court held that the division of Palm Beach
145. Id at 902.
146. Spencer v. State, 545 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1989).
147. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
148. 545 So. 2d 1352.
149. Id at 1355.
150. Id at 1353 (citing.FLA. STAT. § 40.015 (1985)).
151. Id. at 1353-54.
152. Id at 1353.
153. Id (citing FLA. ADMiN. ORDER No. 1.006-1/80).
154. Id. at 1353-54.
155. Id at 1354.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1355 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 and U.S. CONST. amend. VI and XIV).
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County concentrated a disproportionate amount of the county's African-
American population in the Belle Glade district.'
The defendant also challenged the venue provisions of the Palm
Beach system. A defendant charged with a crime in the predominantly
white West Palm Beach district must stand trial in that district, while a
defendant charged with a crime in the predominantly African-American
district could choose the district in which to stand trial.159 The Florida
Supreme Court found that this situation also violated the Florida Consti-
tution and the federal Constitution's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.160
C. New York: A Functional Approach to Vicinage
New York courts take a more flexible view of vicinage and venue
than the Alaska or Florida courts. For example, in People v. Goldswer,161
the court considered the vicinage and venue in the context of a high pub-
licity trial. 162 The defendant, a local sheriff, was indicted on corruption
charges in Schoharie County. The defendant continued to work as sher-
iff during the criminal prosecution. The prosecution maintaining that it
would be impossible to obtain a fair and impartial jury in the county
where the defendant was sheriff, moved for a change of venue. Conse-
quently, the defendant was tried and convicted in Warren County.'63
The defendant challenged his conviction under the federal and New
York constitutions. 64
Justice Wachtler of the New York Court of Appeals found the
change of venue did not violate the Sixth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. 65 He reasoned that a case may be transferred on motion
of either party to insure a fair and impartial trial. 6 6 In addition, the
defendant presented no evidence that the change of venue was an unrea-
sonable burden. 67 The court, however, added protective dicta to its
opinion: "Thus within reasonable limits, the community to which the
trial is transferred should reflect the character of the county where the
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. People v. Goldswer, 350 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y. 1976).
162. Id. at 605.
163. Id at 606.
164. Id at 605-06 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 and U.S. CoNST. amend. VI).
165. Id. at 607-08.
166. Id at 608 (acknowledging the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial in a biased
community).
167. Id at 606. The purpose of transfer was to insure a neutral forum and to allow the
defendant to continue to work as sheriff in the face of local publicity. Id The concern with a
fair trial, which is the underlying reason for the vicinage clause, may have influenced the
outcome.
crime was committed. '
In People v. Shedrick, 69 the defense challenged minority representa-
tion in the vicinage. 7 ' The defendant contended that the selection of
Steuben County jurors from one of the three jury districts, rather than
the entire county, violated the Sixth Amendment.1 71 The court found
that the defendant failed to show that any segment of the community was
excluded.172
Goldswer and Shedrick, taken together, appear to prohibit the prose-
cution from changing venue to obtain a jury pool with a more favorable
demographic composition. Rather than tying vicinage to a physical loca-
tion, New York courts take a functional approach: a change of vicinage
or venue is permitted if it provides a jury pool similar to that of the place
where the crime was committed.
D. Illinois: The Test for Systematic Exclusion and Juror Convenience
in Cook County
Cook County, Illinois is a large and diverse county divided into re-
gional judicial districts. Consequently, the Illinois courts have also grap-
pled with venue and vicinage issues.173
In People v. Flowers, 74 the defendant was arrested for armed rob-
bery on the north side of Chicago and convicted in the Cook County
courthouse in Skokie, a Chicago suburb. 175 The Cook County jury selec-
tion system permits potential jurors to choose their courthouse, depend-
ing on how far they wished to travel. 76 The defendant contended that
under this system, African-Americans were underrepresented in venires
drawn from the predominantly Caucasian suburbs compared to Cook
County as a whole. 17 7
The appellate court upheld the conviction. 7 ' The court, however,
suggested that the defendant may have been able to show a constitutional
violation if he had properly argued the Duren violation and attacked the
jury selection statute itself.17 9
168. Id at 608. See also the companion case People v. Taylor, 350 N.E.2d 600 (N.Y.
1976).
169. 489 N.E.2d 1290,(N.Y. 1985) (per curiam).
170. Id at 1291-92.
171. Id
172. Id at 1292.
173. See also Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 285
(1989), discussed infira notes 190-207 and accompanying text, for the Seventh Circuit's evalua-
tion of Cook County's vicinage practice.
174. 478 N.E.2d 524 (Ml1. 1985).
175. Id at 524-25.
176. Id
177. Id
178. Id at 525-26.
179. Id
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In People v. Johnson,18° the defendant was convicted for home inva-
sion, attempted murder, and aggravated battery on the south side of
Cook County.'' He was tried in Markham, on the far south end of the
county.'" 2 Illinois jury selection statutes provided for the jury pool to be
drawn from (1) the entire city of Markham, (2) the southern half of the
city alone, or (3) the northern half of the city alone."8 3 The goal of the
system was to maximize the possibility of an impartial jury without un-
necessary expense to citizens.'" 4
The defendant argued that the jury drawn from the southern half of
Markham was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause because similarly situated defendants received juries drawn
from a different segment of the county."' The defendant pointed to an-
other criminal court in the south side that pulled potential jurors from
the entire city.' 86 The Illinois Court of Appeals found no equal protec-
tion violation because the defendant failed to demonstrate the exclusion
of a cognizable group.18 7
The defendant also contended that the jury selection system violated
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause because judges and
commissioners could arbitrarily choose the jury pool source.' The
court, however, found sufficient guidelines for drawing of the jury and
rejected the due process violation.'8 9
The Seventh Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of Cook County,
Illinois vicinage practice in Davis v. Warden. 90 The defendant, an Afri-
can-American, was convicted of attempted murder and theft by an all
white jury in Des Plaines, a suburb of Chicago, which was the site of the
crime. 191 Despite the overwhelming odds against obtaining an all white
jury drawn from a random cross-section of Cook County, which includes
Chicago and surrounding suburbs, the defendant's jury was selected from
an all white venire.'192
180. People v. Johnson, 507 N.E.2d 179 (1987).
181. Id. at 180-81.
182. Id. at 181.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 181-82.
186. Id. at 182-83.
187. Id at 183.
188. Id.
189. Id See also People v. Saunders, 543 N.E.2d 1078 (Ill. 1989) (when vicinage included
the county in which the crime was committed, the African-American population for a single
city within the county did not set the level of acceptable African-American representation
within the community).
190. 867 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 285 (19S9).
191. Id. at 1005.
192. Id. at 1005-06.
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This unlikely jury pool could be explained by the Cook County jury
selection system. The Cook County jury commissioner gave the jurors
some choice of which courthouse they preferred to serve.19 3 Most jurors
chose their neighborhood courthouse. 194 Des Plaines is in a predomi-
nantly white area of Cook County.195 Consequently, the white jurors
were often disproportionately represented in the venires at this court
house. The defendant made a Duren challenge to the venire, and the
district court found that such a jury pool violated the Constitution. 196
The Court of Appeals reversed. 97 The majority found that the de-
fendant had not met the Duren test. 198 The majority cautioned, however,
against arbitrary vicinage determinations: "Court employees or prospec-
tive jurors cannot redefine community, once it has been implicitly defined
by the legislature or state court without violating the principle behind
fair-cross-section criterion.... The language of the Sixth Amendment
states 'a defendant... is entitled to a trial.., by an impartial jury of the
state and district..., which district shall be previously ascertained by
law.' "199 The court stated that although a level of arbitrariness existed
in defining the limits of a community, the geographic limits of the com-
munity must be decided before trial, preferably by the legislature.2 °"
Cook County had no such provision.20 1 The court found the practice of
permitting potential jurors to choose a courthouse, based on conven-
ience, resulted in a redefinition of the vicinage.2 °2
The court acknowledged that the defendant met the first two prongs
of Duren: that African-Americans were members of a cognizable
group203 that were significantly underrepresented in the venire.2°4 The
majority, however, found that the defendant failed, using general census
data, to satisfy the third prong: that the underrepresentation of African-
Americans was the result of systematic exclusion.205 The majority found
the statistical evidence presented unconvincing and faulted it for focusing
on the entire African-American population, rather than on the jury eligi-
ble population, in Cook County.206 Further, the majority found that the
defendant had failed to provide evidence showing a causal connection
193. Id (jury commissioner's staff asked for volunteers to serve in suburban courthouses).
194. i d
195. Id at 1005.
196. Id at 1004.
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Duren test).
199. 867 F.2d at 1010 (emphasis in opinion).
200. Id at 1009-10.
201. Id at 1011.
202. Id
203. Id. at 1006.
204. Id at 1011.
205. Id at 1014-15.
206. Id. at 1015.
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between the Cook County selection practice and the absence of African-
Americans in the defendant's jury venire.2 07
Davis illustrates the difficulties in defining vicinage. Admittedly,
the defendant has committed the crime in a predominantly white neigh-
borhood. Under these circumstances, an all white jury pool would not be
a constitutional violation. If the vicinage is defined as Des Plaines, then
the Cook County jury selection system is functioning in a constitutional
manner. If, however, the laws governing the Cook County selection con-
template the entire county as the vicinage, then the gross under-
representation of African-Americans in the Davis venire fails to reflect a
fair cross-section of the community required by the Sixth Amendment
and Duren v. Missouri.20 8
E. California: Altering Vicinage For Administrative Efficiency and
'Convenience
The California courts have engaged in the most extensive debate on
the effect of vicinage and venue on minority representation. California's
jury selection statutes reflect both state and federal constitutional con-
cerns.20 9 These statutes require that the jury pool be drawn from "source
or sources inclusive of a representative cross section of the population of
the area served by the court." '
Until recently, California led the federal courts in defining the scope
of a defendant's constitutional right to a jury that represents a cross-
section of the community." The recent California Supreme Court deci-
sion Hernandez v. Municipal Court,2 12 however, overturned previous de-
cisions213 that protected a defendant's right to a vicinage representative
207. Id, at 1015-17. The dissent, however, maintained that the defendant had made a
prima facie case of systematic exclusion. Id at 1017. The dissent contended that statistics
alone could seldom make out a prima facie case of systematic exclusion, and should therefore
not be the standard. Id The extremely low probability that a forty person venire drawn from
Cook County composed entirely of white jurors, combined with the practice of allowing poten-
tial jurors to express a venue preference suggested systematic exclusion to the dissent. Id at
1017-18.
208. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
209. "The Legislature recognizes that trial by jury is a cherished constitutional right, and
that jury service is an obligation of citizeship." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 191 (West Supp.
1990).
210. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 197 (West Supp. 1990).
211. People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1984) (The California Supreme Court ruled that
a party is constitutionally entitled, under both the California Constitution and the Sixth
Amendment, to as near an approximation of a cross-section of the community as random draw
permits; relying solely on voter registration lists for jury pools systematically excluded minori-
ties.); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978) (The California Supreme Court anticipated
Batson by prohibiting the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes in a racially discriminating
manner.).
212. 781 P.2d 547 (Cal. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3222 (1990).
213. People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 349 (1891); People v. Jones, 510 P.2d 705 (Cal. 1973).
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of the community in which the crime was committed. The companion
decision, Williams v. Superior Court,214 further narrowed defendants'
ability to challenge a non-representative jury pool.
The vicinage issues considered in the California cases have focused
on the Los Angeles County jury selection system. Los Angeles County,
like Cook County in Illinois and Palm Beach County in Florida, is a
sprawling county with neighborhoods of differing racial and socio-eco-
nomic groups. Because of its size, Los Angeles is divided into eleven
judicial divisions.215 Each division has its own courthouse.21 6 Potential
jurors are drawn using a computer program that gives preference to
those living within a twenty mile radius of the courthouse.217 Therefore,
the jury pool reflects the "community" within the twenty mile radius.
In People v. Jones,2"' California adopted the Alvarado rule,219 which
requires that the vicinage include the place of the crime. In Jones, the
defendant was tried in the Southwest Los Angeles district on three
counts of selling marijuana in the Central District of Los Angeles.220
The Central district had a significantly higher percent of juror-eligible
African Americans.22 '
The California Supreme Court held that the vicinage must be drawn
from the area surrounding the crime.222 Drawing the jury from the
Southwest District violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
trial by jury from the district of the crime.223 Although the Jones major-
ity cited 4lvarado, it failed to seriously consider race and community
cross-section. 224 Instead, the majority based its decision on a literal read-
2251d hing of the Sixth Amendment vicinage provision. It analogized the
state judicial "districts" to the congressionally created federal judicial
"districts" and the "district" of the Sixth Amendment.226 The majority
decided that the Los Angeles "district" served by each of the Los Ange-
214. 781 P.2d 537 (Cal. 1989).
215. Ia at 538 n.2 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 69640-50).
216. Id
217. Id at 538.
218. 510 P.2d 705 (Cal. 1973).
219. See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
220. 510 P.2d at 707.
221. Id
222. Id at 710-11.
223. Id at 712.
224. For a detailed analysis of Jones, see John E. Darr, Comment, People v. Jones - The
Jury Must Be Drawn From the District of the Crime, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 547 (1974).
225. 510 P.2d at 711. See also Darr, supra note 224, at 556. Darr notes that while the
Alvarado court focused on the community cross-section analysis of the Sixth Amendment jury
trial requirement, both the Jones majority and the dissent focused more on the historical intent
behind the vicinage requirement. Id
226. The majority concluded that the Judiciary Act of 1789, enacted during the drafting of
the Bill of Rights, defined the broadest sweep of vicinage as the federal judicial district. Jones,
510 P.2d at 711.
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les branch courthouses was equivalent to a federal "district."'2 27 Because
the majority reasoned that a defendant could not be constitutionally
transferred to a different federal district under most circumstances, it
concluded that transferring a trial from the Los Angeles Central District,
the site the crime, to the Southwest District violated the Sixth
Amendment.228
The dissent initially rejected the analogy between the Los Angeles
and federal judicial districts.229 Assuming that the federal and state judi-
cial districts were equivalent, the dissent maintained that the equivalent
of a federal "district" was the entire county, not the small sub-county
"districts."230 Under the dissent's analysis, a Los Angeles courthouse
could constitutionally draw a jury from anywhere within the county
without including the place of the crime.23'
The California Supreme Court overturned Jones in the companion
decisions, Williams v. Superior Court232 and Hernandez v. Municipal
Court.
2 33
In Williams,234 an African-American defendant was convicted of
first degree murder in Santa Monica, which is within Los Angeles
County.235 At that time, a computer program assigned jurors to the dif-
ferent courthouses within the county.236 The program assigned jurors to
the nearest courthouse, typically within twenty miles of her residence.237
The defendant moved to quash the venire because it inadequately
represented the African-American population of Los Angeles County.23 8
The defendant presented evidence that 11% of the county's jury-eligible
population was African-American. Only about 4.5 %, however, of those
appearing for jury duty in the Santa Monica courthouse were African-
American.2 39 Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court ruled that the
defendant failed to show that African-Americans were underrepresented
in the jury pool.'
227. Id.
228. Id at 712.
229. Id. at 714.
230. Id at 714-15.
231. Id See also Darr, supra note 224, at 548-50; Johnson v. Superior Court, 163
Cal.App.3d 85 (1984) (applying Jones to racial discrepancies between jury pools for two San
Diego courthouses).
232. 781 P.2d 537 (Cal. 1989).
233. Hernandez v. Municipal Court, 781 P.2d 547 (Cal. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. CL 3222
(1990).
234. 781 P.2d 537.
235. Id at 538.
236. Id
237. Id
238. Id
239. Id.
240. Id. at 543.
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The court first considered the definition of "community." It con-
cluded that the legislatively created judicial "district" within the Los An-
geles County was the "community" for vicinage purposes.241 The court
found that the twenty mile radius around the courthouse "harmonized"
with these districts.242 As long as the minority representation in the de-
fendant's jury pool was representative of the minority population in that
judicial "district," the jury selection system did not violate the Sixth
Amendment. 243
Justice Broussard, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
with the result that the legislature may define the community as that
within a twenty mile radius of the courthouse. 2 " Broussard emphasized,
however, that it is essential that the vicinage include the site of the
crime.245 He noted that the majority permitted the jury pool to reflect
the area surrounding the trial site, without necessarily including the ac-
tual crime site. 246 Without the vicinage requirement, he stated, the pros-
ecution could forum shop for a more favorable jury pool.2 47
Broussard's discomfort with the Williams reasoning was highlighted
when the California Supreme Court formally overturned Jones in Her-
nandez v. Municipal Court.24 Hernandez was arrested in downtown Los
Angeles for driving while intoxicated and without a license.249 He was
arraigned in the downtown traffic court and then transferred to the San
Fernando Valley division, which was approximately twenty-five miles
away from the downtown courthouse.25 0 Because the jury selection sys-
tem generated a jury pool composed of people living within a twenty mile
radius of the courthouse,2 ' the probability that anyone from the site of
the crime would be in the jury pool was very low. 2 5 2 The defendant
maintained that such a selection system violated his Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by a jury of the vicinage.25 a
The California Supreme Court overruled Jones.2 54 Echoing the
Jones dissent, the Hernandez majority analogized the Los Angeles Mu-
nicipal Court system to divisions within federal court districts.25 5 Using
241. Id at 541-42.
242. Id at 542.
243. Id at 542-43.
244. Id at 544-45 (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
245. Id at 545 (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246. Id
247. Id
248. 781 P.2d. 547.
249. Id at 549.
250. Id
251. Id at 549 n.3.
252. Id at 549.
253. Id
254. Id at 548-49.
255. Id at 552-54.
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this analogy, it found no Sixth Amendment violation in transferring the
defendant to a different branch within the county/district. 2 6 The court
defined "vicinage" as coterminous with the county rather than the
smaller municipal or superior court judicial district where the crime oc-
curred.257 According to the court, the defendant could be tried within
any of the county's districts.258 The majority also added a policy argu-
ment: because personal knowledge was undesirable in potential jurors, a
venire drawn from the vicinity of the crime was of little consequence.2 59
Justice Mosk dissented, stating that while the Sixth Amendment
permits the legislature to define the outer limits of the vicinage, it must
include the area where the crime occurred.26  He noted that in Her-
nandez the majority defined vicinage as all of Los Angeles County, but in
Williams the majority defined vicinage as the local area surrounding
courthouses.26' Mosk criticized the majority's definitions of "commu-
nity," "district," and "vicinage" in Hernandez and Williams as confusing
and inconsistent.262
Justice Broussard dissented separately. He found the majority's def-
inition of community as the district, which may include any part of the
county, logically inconsistent. 263 He further maintained that the major-
ity's analysis would permit prosecutors to choose a judicial district which
they perceived would have a favorable racial composition.2" In this
way, prosecutors could circumvent the fundamental constitutional rights
of defendants by excluding members of racial groups from jury pools.2 65
Broussard further contended that combining the Hernandez and Wil-
liams decisions threatened defendants' Sixth Amendment right to be
tried by a jury drawn from the district of the crime.266 He also criticized
the majority for failing to address the role of juries in protecting the
256. Id.
257. Id. at 556-57.
258. See id. (rejecting that a Los Angeles judicial "district" was equivalent to the "district"
of the Sixth Amendment).
259. Id.
260. Id at 557 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
261. Id
262. Id. Mosk reproached the majority for defining "community" as all of Los Angeles
County in Williams, and then equating "community" to judicial district in Hernandez. He
advocated defining "district" and "community" as a Los Angeles judicial district in all cases.
263. Id. at 557-58 (Broussard, J., dissenting). A few months before the Williams and Her-
nandez decisions, a unanimous California Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of the
Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement to the accused and the community in People v. Guz-
man, 755 P.2d 917 (Cal. 1989). The Williams opinion failed to consider the ramifications of
Guzman.
264. 781 P.2d at 557-58.
265. Id
266. Id In addition, in his Williams opinion, Broussard noted that combining Williams
and Hernandez with two other recent decisions, People v. Bell, 778 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1989), cert
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2576 (1990), and People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1989), drastically
rights of the accused and acting as the conscience of the community:
"[T]he protective interaction of the right to a representative jury and the
right to a jury of the vicinage fails if 'community' means one thing for
jury representation and something quite different for vicinage." '267
Broussard concluded by advocating a definition of community that is co-
terminous with the judicial district.268
Thus, the impact of vicinage on jury pool composition has been de-
bated in different forums. Different courts have differed in their inter-
pretation of the meaning of the Sixth Amendment vicinage clause and its
relationship to the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury
and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
IV. Critique of Current Approaches to Vicinage and Venue
A. Vicinage and the Cross-Section of the Community Requirement
The right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury is a right fundamen-
tal to the American criminal justice system.2 69 To prevent the govern-
ment from infringing the right to a fair and impartial jury, "[t]he
Supreme Court established the fair cross section of the community crite-
rion, not to exclude minorities, but to increase their participation in the
system." 27° A long line of federal and state court decisions on this issue
"indicate that [legislators] must create the jury selection system with an
eye to the policies of fairness and inclusiveness.,
271
The Sixth Amendment vicinage clause has not been expressly incor-
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.272 Yet the
cases upholding the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial strongly sug-
gest that the vicinage provision has been implicitly incorporated as part
of this right via the Due Process Clause.
A number of assumptions are implicit in the Sixth Amendment
cross-section of the community and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection policies: first, members of different segments of the community
will have some inherent bias; second, a jury that includes all segments of
the community will balance these biases; third, this balance will result in
a fair jury; fourth, a jury selection system that excludes a segment of the
hindered a defendant's ability to make prima faie case of a nonrepresentative jury pools. 781
P.2d 537, 546.
267. Hernandez, 781 P.2d at 559-60.
268. IdL at 561.
269. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
270. Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003, 1013 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 285
(1989) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)).
271. Id at 1012 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) and Alvarado v. State, 486
P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971)).
272. Duncan, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is a fundamental
right and applies to the states); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (jury size of twelve is
not preserved by the Sixth Amendment).
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community, particularly a members of the defendant's race, threatens the
impartiality of the jury.27 3
The Framers drafted the venue and vicinage provisions in the con-
stitution to prevent abuses of the Anglo-American jury trial that existed
under colonial rule.274 One of these abuses was trying colonial defend-
ants in England.275 Today, however, there is little concern that a crimi-
nal defendant accused of a crime in Los Angeles will be tried, against his
or her will, in London or New York. Few defendants or defense attor-
neys would argue that a defendant accused of a crime in Chicago suffers
undue hardship by attending a trial in Des Plaines.
Nonetheless, the constitutional vicinage and venue provisions are
still relevant today. The cross-section requirement prevents the govern-
ment from manipulating the jury pool to exclude segments of the com-
munity from jury service. The jurisprudence of the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair and impartial jury, and the Fourteenth Amendment right
to equal protection, has inextricably linked the composition of the jury
pool to the lines defining the geographic limits of the community. The
vicinage, the geographic area where the jury originates, defines the com-
munity: "[w]hether the disparity in representation here is significant
hinges on defining what constitutes community." 27 6
The greatest danger posed by neglecting the Sixth Amendment vici-
nage provision is the prosecution's potential ability to forum shop for
what it perceives to be the most advantageous jury pool. Today, a prose-
cutor may no longer use peremptory challenges to remove members of
cognizable groups from the jury pool. 2 77 If a prosecutor believed that a
jury with little or no minority representation would be advantageous to
her case, however, she could conceivably shop for a forum with a com-
munity with a small minority population. Because the constitutional
level of minority representation in the jury pool is tied to minority popu-
lation in the community,27 8 a prosecutor could manipulate venue and
vicinage to obtain a minority-poor jury pool. The result would be identi-
cal to a pre-Strauder2 79 statute excluding groups from jury service, or a
pre-Batson 2so prosecutor removing all minorities from the venire: to en-
sure a jury that contains no minority members. The value of preventing
the prosecution from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially dis-
criminatory manner is undermined if the courts interpret vicinage to ex-
clude minorities or dilute their presence.
273. See Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 23-25.
274. See supra note 28, and accompanying text.
275. Id.
276. People v. Johnson, 209 Cal. Rptr. 425, 427 (1984).
277. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
278. Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
279. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See supra notes 64-58 and accompanying text.
280. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
The ability of a prosecutor to manipulate the jury pool runs counter
to the due process concept of the jury as a hedge against arbitrary abuses
of governmental power,2 1 as well as a defendant's right to equal
protection.28 2
B. Other Fourteenth Amendment Considerations
The right of segments of the community to participate in the crimi-
nal justice system provides another rationale for prohibiting exclusive
jury selection systems. Failure to consider the effect of vicinage on mi-
nority representation also discriminates against members of minority-
dense communities by preventing participation in the judicial process.283
The jury is a democratic manifestation in a nondemocratic judicial insti-
tution.2 4 "Just as popular election helps to legitimize legislatures to
members of the society, lay participation on juries provides legitimation
for the judicial process. '285 Community involvement in the process, act-
ing as the "conscience of the community," adds integrity and reliability
to nondemocratic judicial institutions.28 6 Consequently, "[t]he vicinage
right belongs to the community as well as to the accused. ' 28 7 Manipulat-
ing the system to exclude particular groups undermines the role of the
public in the criminal justice process.
C. Comparing Approaches
State courts have debated the meaning of the Sixth Amendment vic-
inage requirement. Some courts have avoided linking vicinage to the
community comprising the jury pool. Typically, these courts" have de-
flected such challenges by finding no evidence of systematic exclusion
and dismissing statistics presented as unreliable or inconclusive under the
Duren test.288
Assuming that the Sixth Amendment's vicinage provision applies to
the states, the Alaska Supreme Court's opinion in Alvarado v. State,289
with its emphasis on community-cross section, is most consistent with
281. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
155-57 (1968).
282. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
283. "Since these community standards are determined by the attitudes and experiences of
the jurors, the jury is a legitimating device only to those who are a part of the community
whose norms the jury expresses." Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531 (1970).
284. See Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 1.
285. Note, supra note 283, at 531.
286. Id at 531-33.
287. People v. Guzman, 755 P.2d 917, 929 (Cal. 1989). See also Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct.
1364, 1366 (1991). See generally, Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Demo-
cratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 247 (1973).
288. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
289. 486 P.2d 891, 901 (Alaska 1971). See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
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the policies and the original intent underlying the Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury.
The interpretation of People v. Jones2" in California, although
reaching the same result as Alvarado, is a strained interpretation of the
vicinage requirement. The majority's failure to consider the policies un-
derlying the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial weakened the opinion.
It neglected the important policies behind the requirement, and focused
on artificial analogies between federal and Los Angeles County "dis-
tricts."29' The majority's conclusion that the jury must be drawn from
the local Los Angeles judicial "district" where the crime was committed
rested on how it chose to define district.292 The dissent's parallel reason-
ing that Los Angeles County districts were r~ally analogous to federal
divisions, and not districts, further reveals the weakness of the majority
293opinion.
When Hernandez overturned Jones,2 94 the California Supreme
Court simply adopted the definition of "district" offered by the dissent in
Jones. This approach severed the concepts of vicinage community and
representativeness. The California court's semantics undermined the val-
ues underlying the community cross-section requirement.
Hernande295 and Mallett 296 are especially troubling. Past federal
and state decisions had stressed the importance of the defendant's right
to a trial by the cross-section of the community, 297 and racial discrimina-
tion in the jury selection process is contrary to this right: "Where [sic]
decisions of this Court have been concerned largely with discrimination
during selection of the venire, the principles announced there also forbid
discrimination on account of race in selection of the petit jury.""29
Unlike California courts, some courts have at least added dicta pro-
tecting the cross-section requirement, even if a defendant's right to a jury
drawn from the cross-section of the community in which the crime was
committed is not unequivocally protected.299 Although the lack of com-
mitment in these decisions is not always satisfactory, the language ap-
pears to provide defendants with more protection than the decisions of
the California and Missouri courts. For example, the dicta in the Illinois
cases indicate that the courts wanted the defendant to prove that the
290. 510 P.2d 705 (Cal. 1973), overruled by Hemandez v. Municipal Court, 781 P.2d 547
(1989). See supra notes 218-32 and accompanying text.
291. Id
292. Id
293. See supra notes 218-32 and accompanying text. See also Darr, supra note 224, at 547.
294. 781 P.2d 547 (Cal. 1989). See supra notes 248-78 and accompanying text.
295. Id
296. 769 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1989) (en bane), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 1308 (1990).
297. See supra notes 52-104 and accompanying text.
298. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
299. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
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vicinage caused the systematic exclusion of a cognizable group." Like-
wise, the New York cases301 suggest changing venue is permissible only if
it is in the defendant's interest. These decisions are consistent with the
values underlying the community cross-section requirement.
Justice Marshall's application of the Batson test in his dissent in
Mallet v. Missouri,30 2 however, is inconsistent with previous jury pool
composition analysis. The Batson test is designed to prevent abuses dur-
ing the jury selection process, not to determine the vicinage or the jury
pool. Although many of the same concerns underlie the discrimination
during jury selection and jury_ pool composition, evidentiary concerns
differ. A prosecutor's discriminatory intent is easier to ascertain when
she exercises peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner
than when she moves for a change in venue. Systematic exclusion is diffi-
cult to prove, and discriminatory intent would be even harder. Requir-
ing a cross-section of the community provides the effective and workable
approach to challenging venue and vicinage-driven changes of jury pool
composition.
D. Judicial Administration Concerns and Vicinage
Many vicinage challenges arise from statutes designed to lessen ju-
ror inconvenience and docket pressure.303 Yet Taylor 304 and Duren30 5
strongly suggest that only a significant state interest can outweigh a de-
fendant's right to a jury that reasonably represents the community.3 6 In
Taylor, the Court stated that administrative efficiency failed to justify a
jury selection system that significantly underrepresented women in the
jury pool.307 Likewise, the state's interest in having juror's traveling an
extra twenty miles is not a sufficiently significant state interest to com-
promise the right to trial by jury by the cross-section of the community.
As the Davis"'5 court acknowledged: "To permit... jurors to define the
community in which they serve based on convenience undermines the
objectivity of the jury selection system. ' '309
The Taylor majority also noted that a "distinct quality is lost" from
300. See supra notes 173-208 and accompanying text. One may argue, however, that the
Illinois courts have made meeting the third prong of Duren practically impossible by requiring
defendants to show systematic exclusion of cognizable groups within the judicial district where
they are tried.
301. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
302. 110 S.Ct. 1308 (1990).
303. See eg., Hernandez v. Municipal Court, 781 P.2d 547 (Cal. 1989); Spencer v. State,
545 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 1989); Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1989).
304. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
305. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
306. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534-38; Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68.
307. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534-38.
308. Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1989).
309. Id at 1013.
TRIAL BY A REPRESENTATIVE JURY
Fall 19911
Fall 1991]
290 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:261
the courthouse when women were excluded from jury service.310 Simi-
larly, excluding the members of the community in which the crime oc-
curred, particularly when excluding the community results in a
decreased representation of distinct groups, is a loss to the criminal jus-
tice system.
One possible approach that accommodates varying docket pressures
of different courthouses and the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
would be to allow changes of venue to a quieter judicial districts, while
the drawing the jury from the vicinage.
E. The Effect of Vicinage on the Jury
Failure to acknowledge the role of vicinage threatens minority rep-
resentation in jury pools and juries. Reducing minority representation
can affect deliberations and verdicts.3"' Studies evaluating the effective-
ness of juries of less than twelve have noted that smaller juries have a
lower proportion of minority viewpoints.3 "' Individuals that share a
viewpoint not shared by the majority of the jurors can express that view-
point more effectively than if only one person holds that viewpoint.313
Consequently, increasing the number of jurors holding minority view-
points increases the quality of the deliberations. 14 Removing minorities
from jury pools by manipulating the vicinage ultimately would adversely
affect jury deliberations.
F. The Influence of Vicinage on Juries and Verdicts
Vicinage and juror knowledge of local conditions can affect the out-
come of trials.31 "Even today the juror still performs the vital role of
applying his or her general knowledge of the vicinage to the construction
of the fact.... [D]espite the modem rule, verdicts are still often influ-
enced by jurors' personal knowledge of local customs, attitudes, and even
people and places." '316 From this view, "[e]nsuring the jury's integrity
may necessitate different approaches in today's complex society than in
310. I& at 532.
311. See Richard 0. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Re-
search and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REv. 644, 670-73 (1975).
312. Hans Zeisel, The Verdict of Five out of Six Civil Jurors" Constitutional Problems, 1982
AM. B. FOUND. Rns. J. 141, 146 (1982).
313. Id.
314. Lempert, supra note 311, at 671-73. Other data suggest that members of minority
groups are less likely to convict members of minority groups and tend to give them lighter
sentences, thus raising equal protection problems. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and
the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611, 1621-22 (1985). Studies showing that such juries are
more likely to be hung also suggest excluding minorities from the jury system will affect ver-
dicts and deliberation. Lempert, supra note 311 at 676-77, 693-98.
315. Mitnick, supra note 16, at 235; Dale W. Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Require-
ment: An Empirical Look, 45 NEa. L. REV. 99, 101 (1966).
316. Mitnick, supra note 16, at 235 (citing Broeder, supra note 315, at 101).
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medieval England or colonial America." '317 Despite voir dire318 and
other methods of screening jurors with personal knowledge of the dis-
pute, juror knowledge of local conditions may play a part in
deliberations. 19
V. A Proposed Approach to Analyzing Vicinage Issues
A. The Vicinage Clause Should Apply to the States
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide if the
vicinage provision applies to the states, previous Supreme Court deci-
sions and due process concerns suggest it should.320 The most compel-
ling argument for finding the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement
applicable to the states is a defendant's right to be tried by a jury drawn
from the cross-section of the community.321 Vicinage is the starting
point for determining the "community" for the purposes of the cross-
section of the community test of Taylor322 and Duren.323  Previous
Supreme Court decisions suggest that the Court assumes the vicinage
right is part of the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by a fair and impar-
tial jury. For example, the Court's reasoning in Williams v. Florida,24
suggests that the vicinage provision should apply to the states. In Wil-
liams, the Court held that a state defendant had no constitutional right to
a trial by a twelve-member jury.32 As part of its analysis, the Court
juxtaposed the history of the right to a jury chosen from the vicinage
with the right to a trial by a twelve-member jury.326 The Court noted
the vicinage requirement was deliberately drafted into the Constitution in
concert with the adoption of the 1789 Judiciary Act.32
7
In contrast, no explicit twelve-member jury provision was drafted
into the Sixth Amendment. 328 The Court reasoned that if the Framers
317. Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 9.
318. Criminal voir dire is conducted by judges in a number of jurisdictions, including the
federal, FED. R. CRIM. P. 24, and California courts, CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 223 (West
Supp. 1991).
319. Broeder, supra note 315, at 101. Consequently, a jury of the vicinage may be at odds
with an "impartial jury."
320. See supra notes 52-104 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
322. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). See also Kershen, Vicinage (pt. I), 30 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 131
(1977) (interpreting the Framers' intent to mean that under the Sixth Amendment, one cannot
exclude jurors from the area surrounding the site of the crime from the juror selection
process).
323. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
324. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
325. Id at 86.
326. Id at 87-97 and accompanying notes.
327. Id at 93-97 and accompanying notes (discussing incorporation of vicinage require-
ment into the Constitution).
328. Id.
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had intended to preserve the right to a twelve person jury, the language
of the Sixth Amendment would have included a specific reference.3 29
The Court declined to impose a twelve-member jury trial requirement
under the Fourteenth Amendment because it found no such requirement
in the Sixth Amendment.330 The Sixth Amendment, however, explicitly
requires a jury drawn from the district where the crime was commit-
ted. 3 3 1 From the Court's analysis in Williams one can infer that the right
to a jury drawn from the vicinage was integral to the Sixth Amendment
and should apply to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause.
B. Community Cross-Section Test For the Constitutionality of a
Vicinage
A solution to the vicinage problem should reflect the policies under-
lying the Sixth Amendment community cross section requirement: 1) to
prevent the prosecution from forum shopping; 2) allow citizen participa-
tion in the judicial system; and 3) to prevent exclusion of cognizable
groups.
Professor Kershen has proposed a test for the constitutionality of
the vicinage.332 The test would require: 1) a clearly defined vicinage;333
and 2) a jury pool drawn from the vicinage.334 The vicinage may be
constitutional even if the jury pool is not drawn exclusively from the
entire vicinage, if the jury pool fairly represents the vicinage as a
whole. 335
Kershen's approach flows out of a community cross-section analysis
of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions. This functional ap-
proach employs workable standards to determine equivalent representa-
tion among communities. It preserves the defendant's right to a trial by
a cross-section of the community. In addition, this approach deters fo-
rum shopping by maintaining the jury pool composition despite a change
in venue or vicinage.
Permitting a change of venue under these circumstances would also
help ease docket pressures in courts with heavy schedules, and facilitate
the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy and public trial.33 6
Kershen's approach would also avoid the evidentiary problems of prov-
329. Id at 97-99.
330. Id at 102-03.
331. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
332. Kershen, supra note 322, at 119-21.
333. For example, the vicinage statute should make clear that its limits are the twenty mile
radius around the courthouse or the entire county.
334. See Kershen supra note 322, at 119-21.
335. Id This approach is also suggested in People v. Goldswer, 350 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y.
1976). See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
336. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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ing the systematic exclusion requirement of Duren.3 7
A cross-section of the community approach would have another
benefit. Prosecutors would be discouraged from forum shopping, pre-
serving the community's right to participate in the judicial system as
jurors.3 3
8
Another approach would be a strict geographical interpretation of
venue and vicinage. Under this approach, a trial must be held in the
district where the crime was committed. Using the cross-section analy-
sis, a trial will not always take place in the vicinity where the crime was
committed. A strict geographical approach also would ensure that the
members of the community affected by the crime administer the law to
the particular facts. A trial held closer to the site of the crime provides a
better chance of getting evidence and witnesses. It is unclear, however,
how significant a factor this would be in an intra-county situation such as
Los Angeles.
Jury selection practices should conform to the policies set forth in
Alvarado v. State.339 Admittedly, a certain level of arbitrariness exists in
drawing up jury districts. Vicinage and community, however, should be
defined in a consistent manner to keep a defendant's trial in the district of
the alleged crime, or use that district's demographic composition to eval-
uate the constitutionality of the defendant's jury pool.
Conclusion
The role of the jury requires a community cross-section with ade-
quate minority representation. Exclusion of particular groups, such as
ethnic minorities, from jury pools will result in fewer minorities in juries,
which may affect deliberations and verdicts. Exclusion of minorities
from jury pools denies defendants their Sixth Amendment right to a trial
by a representative jury. Failure to consistently and fairly define vicinage
also prevents members in minority-dense communities from participating
in the judicial process.
The decisions of a number of jurisdictions, such as California and
Missouri, are at odds with the Sixth Amendment and the policies repre-
sented by Taylor, Duren, and Batson.
"At the heart of the problem of determining whether a jury may be
considered impartial lies the notion of the proper community from
which the jury should be drawn. If we are to decide that the
source from which jurors are drawn either does or does not repre-
sent a fair cross-section of the community, then we must inquire
337. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
338. Cf Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (defendant has standing to assert the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection rights of those excluded from jury service due to race).
339. 486 P.2d 891, 901 (Alaska 1971). See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
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into what may properly be deemed a community.""
If the state may define the vicinage in an arbitrary or inconsistent manner
that is independent of "community," the promise of a representative jury
drawn from the cross-section of the community is a hollow one.
340. Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 901 (Alaska 1971).
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